DEMO REPORT — EMBER PROTOCOL (EMBER) — SIMULATED DATA← TOKEN PAGE

Sentinel/Ethereum/0xdemo…0001/Full Audit
C
Grade

Ember ProtocolEMBER

0xdemo…0001 Generated May 28, 2025
Verified Source
No Honeypot
Manual Audit
Bug Bounty
0Critical
3High
4Medium
2Low
findings
Price
$0.04217
24h
-3.42%
Market Cap
$42.17M
Volume 24h
$182.4K
Holders
3,847
0/100
High
Risk Score
63
/100
High
Top Risk Findings
  • #1Owner retains mint authority — unlimited inflation possible
  • #2Pause function lets owner freeze all token transfers
  • #3Liquidity is unlocked — LP removal possible without notice
Full analysis in sections below

AUTOMATED AI REPORT. Not a substitute for a manual security audit. Firepan Sentinel does not guarantee this token is safe. Always conduct independent research before investing.

01

Executive Summary

Firepan Sentinel has completed an automated AI-assisted risk analysis of Ember Protocol (EMBER) on Ethereum Mainnet. The contract received an overall risk score of 63/100, placing it in the High Risk category. The primary concerns are centralization of admin controls — the deployer address retains the ability to mint new tokens and pause all token transfers without a timelock or multisig. While the source code is verified and the contract does not exhibit honeypot characteristics, these owner permissions represent a material risk for investors. Liquidity of approximately $420,000 is present across Uniswap V3, though it is not locked. Holder distribution shows moderate concentration, with the top 10 holders controlling 44.2% of supply. This report is generated through automated analysis and AI interpretation. It does not constitute a manual security audit and should not be treated as a guarantee of safety.

02

Token Overview

NameEmber Protocol
SymbolEMBER
ChainEthereum
Contract0xdemo…0001
Risk Score63 / 100
Risk LevelHigh
GeneratedMay 28, 2025
Scan TypeFull AI Audit

Ember Protocol is an ERC-20 token deployed on Ethereum Mainnet with a fixed total supply of 1 billion EMBER. The contract is compiled with Solidity v0.8.20 under the MIT license. The token has been live for 498 days and currently trades primarily on Uniswap V3.

03

Contract Risk Analysis

The contract source code is verified on Etherscan, allowing full code review. The contract follows standard ERC-20 patterns with Ownable extensions. Three admin functions present elevated risk: mint(), pause(), and setMaxTx(). The contract is not upgradeable via a proxy pattern.

  • Source code verified — full auditability
  • ERC-20 compliant — standard transfer/approve/allowance interface
  • No proxy or upgrade mechanism — code cannot be changed post-deployment
  • mint() is callable by owner — supply can be increased at will
  • pause() halts all transfers — owner can freeze user funds
  • setMaxTx() allows owner to restrict transaction size
04

Ownership & Admin Controls

The contract uses OpenZeppelin's Ownable pattern. Ownership has NOT been renounced and no multisig or timelock is configured. The deployer wallet (0xDeployer...cafe) retains all administrative privileges. This is the most significant risk factor in this report.

  • Ownership active — 0xDeployer123456789abcdef0000000000000cafe
  • No multisig (Gnosis Safe, etc.) detected on owner address
  • No timelock contract protecting admin functions
  • renounceOwnership() function present but not called
  • transferOwnership() present — owner can be transferred to new address
05

Upgradeability & Proxy Risk

The contract is not upgradeable. No proxy patterns (UUPS, Transparent, Beacon) were detected. The deployed bytecode is final and cannot be modified by the owner. This is a positive signal — the contract logic is immutable.

  • No proxy pattern detected
  • No upgradeTo() or upgradeToAndCall() functions
  • Contract bytecode is immutable
06

Minting / Burning / Blacklist / Pause

The mint function is the highest individual risk in this contract. An unconstrained mint() callable only by owner allows theoretically unlimited token creation. The burn function is present and standard. No blacklist function was detected, which is positive.

  • mint(address to, uint256 amount) — callable by owner, no cap enforced in the function itself
  • burn(uint256 amount) — user-initiated burn, standard
  • burnFrom(address, uint256) — standard with allowance check
  • No blacklist or address freeze function detected
  • pause() / unpause() — owner can halt all transfers
07

Holder Concentration

Holder distribution shows moderate-to-high concentration. The top 10 holders control 44.2% of circulating supply, and the largest single holder controls 12.1%. With 3,847 total holders, distribution is reasonable for a token of this age, but concentration remains above thresholds considered healthy.

  • Top 10 holders: 44.2% of supply
  • Top 50 holders: 71.8% of supply
  • Largest single holder: 12.1% — potential for significant price impact
  • Total holders: 3,847
  • Concentration has likely decreased over the 498-day token lifetime
Top 10 holders44.2%
Top 50 holders71.8%
Largest holder12.1%
08

Liquidity Risk

Approximately $420,000 in liquidity is available across Uniswap V3 pools. This represents adequate but not deep liquidity. The primary risk is that liquidity is not locked — the 34 LP holders could withdraw at any time. Pair is 412 days old, suggesting organic market formation.

  • Total liquidity: ~$420,000 USD
  • Primary DEX: Uniswap V3
  • Liquidity is NOT locked — no Unicrypt or Team.Finance lock detected
  • Pair age: 412 days — established trading history
  • 34 LP token holders — relatively small LP base
  • Buy/sell tax: 2% each — within acceptable range
$420K
Total Liquidity
412d
Pair Age
No
LP Locked
2% / 2%
Buy/Sell Tax
09

Honeypot / Transfer Restriction Signals

NO HONEYPOT DETECTED BY AUTOMATED SCAN

No honeypot signals were detected by automated scanning. Tokens can be sold freely with no transfer restrictions beyond the standard max transaction limit. GoPlus Security reports no trading restrictions.

  • No cannot_sell_all signal
  • No trading cooldown detected
  • Transfers are not unconditionally pausable by design flaw
  • Sell tax is 2% — within normal range
  • Owner CAN pause transfers via pause() — this is different from a honeypot but still a risk
10

Known Vulnerability Patterns

  • Owner-controlled mint with no supply cap in the mint function itself
  • Centralized pause mechanism without timelock — single point of failure
  • Liquidity not locked — LP removal possible without notice
  • No on-chain governance or multisig protecting admin functions
11

AI Risk Interpretation

Ember Protocol presents a risk profile typical of projects in early-to-mid maturity stages that have not yet implemented decentralization safeguards. The technical implementation is clean — verified source, ERC-20 compliant, non-upgradeable — but the administrative control structure concentrates significant power in a single externally-owned account. The mint function is the most consequential risk. Unlike a simple administrative function, uncapped minting allows the token supply to be inflated arbitrarily, which could devastate token value. The presence of this function, combined with unrenounced single-owner control, means investors are trusting the deployer's ongoing good faith. The pause function compounds this: in a worst-case scenario, an owner could mint tokens to their own address and then pause transfers to prevent victims from selling. While there is no evidence this is intended, the capability exists. On the positive side: the verified source code, established pair age, absence of blacklisting, and clean honeypot scan suggest a legitimate project with standard risks rather than a deliberate scam. The question is whether the team intends to renounce or transition to multisig — this should be verified off-chain through official communications.

12

Suggested Remediation

  1. 1Transfer contract ownership to a Gnosis Safe multisig with 2-of-3 or higher threshold
  2. 2Add a Timelock controller (minimum 48-hour delay) before owner can execute privileged functions
  3. 3Lock liquidity using Unicrypt or Team.Finance for a minimum of 12 months
  4. 4If continued mint capability is needed, add an onchain supply cap to the mint function
  5. 5Publish a public ownership/decentralization roadmap with committed timelines
  6. 6Consider renouncing the pause() function if it is not operationally necessary
  7. 7Reduce top holder concentration through LP incentives or vesting cliff adjustments
13

Final Risk Rating

0/100
High
63/100
High

Based on 15+ weighted risk dimensions across contract code, ownership, liquidity, and holder data.

Score Breakdown

Source code is verified on-chain+10
Single owner controls admin functions-10
Owner can mint new tokens — inflation risk-12
Contract can be paused by owner-8
No blacklist function detected+5
Non-upgradeable contract+5
Transfer fees or limits can be changed by owner-5
High concentration — top 10 holders own >40%-5
Moderate liquidity ($100K–$1M)+5
Liquidity is NOT locked — rug risk-5
No honeypot signals detected+10
Token is >90 days old+2
Final Score63/100
14

Disclaimer

This report is generated using automated analysis and AI interpretation. It is not a substitute for a manual security audit by qualified auditors. Firepan Sentinel does not guarantee that a token or smart contract is safe. This report does not constitute financial, legal, or investment advice.

This report does not constitute financial, legal, or investment advice. Always conduct independent research and consult qualified professionals before making decisions related to any token or smart contract.